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SUMMARY 
Each year a large number of landing overruns occur worldwide. Safety statistics 
of commercial airline operators show that on average there is almost one landing 
overrun occurrence every week. Although many of these occurrences are not 
catastrophic still about half of all landing overruns do cause significant damage 
to the aircraft and/or injuries to the passengers and crew. Each year there are 
also a number of landing overruns that resulted in third party damage and 
injuries on the ground. To operators it is therefore interesting to know how big 
their overrun risk is and what possible actions could be taken to reduce this risk. 
 
A study conducted by NLR-Air Transport Safety Institute showed that factors such 
as long landings, high on approach, excess approach speed, slippery runways, 
significant tailwind etc. increase the risk of a landing overrun. However, to an 
individual operator these factors are not very meaningful unless the exposure of 
the operator's fleet to these factors is taken into account. The current paper 
presents the development of a methodology that determines the risk of an 
operator of having a landing overrun in their operation. The methodology is 
based on the exposure that an operator has to certain landing overrun risk 
factors which are combined and weighted into a safety performance index. This 
index represents the relative risk an operator has compared to a reference 
condition in which all risk factors are absent. This landing overrun risk index is 
easy to manage and to monitor. The methodology requires a number of input 
parameters which partly can be obtained from standard flight data monitoring 
programs. The presented method is illustrated by applying it to actual data 
obtained from different operators. Variation of the landing overrun index by 
aircraft type, location, season etc are shown.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The first official aircraft accident reported in 2008 was with a NAMC YS-11 
aircraft operated by Philippine carrier Asian Spirit, which overran the runway on 
landing at Masbate in the central Philippines on January 2nd 2008. Since that 
date at least 27 other landing overrun accidents occurred in 2008 and many 
more incidents. Each year a large number of landing overruns occur worldwide. 
Safety statistics of commercial airline operators show that on average there is 
almost one landing overrun occurrence (varying from an accident to a minor 
incident) every week. Although many of these occurrences are not catastrophic 
still about half of all landing overruns do cause significant damage to the aircraft 
and/or injuries to the passengers and crew. Each year there are also a number of 
landing overruns that resulted in third party damage and injuries on the ground. 
To operators it is therefore important to know how large their overrun risk is and 
what possible actions could be taken to reduce this risk. Such knowledge would 
perfectly fit in an operator's Safety Management System. Many operators do 
monitor their flights using the data taken from the quick access recorder and 
analyse reported incidents in their fleet. Although the number of landing 
overruns is high, individual operators normally will have not many landing 
overruns in their archives to learn from. However they do have data on the 
factors that are known to increase the risk of a landing overrun. Currently only 
limited use is made of this information in managing landing overrun risk. This 
paper will show the development of a method to derive a risk index which will 
help the operators to monitor and manage their landing overrun risk. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
A study conducted by NLR-Air Transport Safety Institute showed that factors such 
as long landings, high on approach, excess approach speed, slippery runways, 
and significant tailwind etc. increase the risk of a landing overrun [Van Es, 
(2005)]. However, to an individual operator these factors are not very meaningful 
unless the exposure of the operator's fleet to these factors is taken into account. 
This paper will present the development of a methodology that determines the 
risk of an operator of having a landing overrun in their operation. The 
methodology is based on the exposure that an operator has to certain landing 
overrun risk factors which are combined and weighted into an index. The index 
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represents the relative risk an operator has compared to a reference condition in 
which all risk factors are absent. The landing overrun risk index should be easy 
to manage and to monitor.  
 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE PAPER 
In section 2 the development of the method is presented. Section 3 discusses an 
application of the method. Conclusions and recommendations are given in 
section 4. 
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2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD 
2.1 APPROACH 
The methodology is based on the exposure that an operator has to certain 
landing overrun risk factors which are combined and weighted into an index. The 
method was first explored by Tauss [Tauss, (2008)] which studied the concept of 
the landing overrun index. This paper reflects the continuation of this work. The 
index represents the relative risk an operator has compared to a reference 
condition in which all risk factors are absent. In this case the index will have 
value of one. Risk index values above one would indicate an increased landing 
overrun risk. As the method should also account for the influence of available 
runway length the risk index could become less than one when for instance a 
landing is conducted with a large runway margin (difference between available 
and required runway length to stop the aircraft).  Again it should be realised that 
a risk index of one means that the landing overrun risk is equal to the reference 
condition in which all risk factors are absent and that the available runway length 
does not affect the overrun risk in that case. 
 
2.2 LANDING OVERRUN RISK FACTORS 
An estimate of the risk of having a landing overrun accident with a particular risk 
factor present is accomplished by calculating a risk ratio [Van Es, (2005)]. This 
risk ratio provides insight on the association of a factor on the risk in a landing 
overrun accident. The risk ratio is the rate of the accident probability with the 
factor present over the accident probability without the factor present. The risk 
ratio is given by the following formula: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
factorrisk  a of presence without landings normal
factor risk  a of presence without accidents
factorrisk  a of presence with landings normal
factor risk  a of presence with accidents
RatioRisk  
Risk ratio values greater than 1 indicate an increased level of risk due to the 
presence of a particular factor. A risk ratio of 4 means that the probability of 
accident with the risk factor present is 4 time higher than without its presence. 
Positive associations between a risk factor and landing overruns accidents show 
that a demonstrated association exists. However it does not prove causation.  
In [Van Es, (2005)] a number of factors that increase the risk of a landing overrun 
are identified and quantified using historical data. In [Van Es, (2005)] risk ratios 
are provided for the following factors: Non-precision approach, touching down 
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far beyond the threshold (long landing), excess approach speed, visual approach, 
significant tailwind present, high on approach, wet/flooded runway, and/or 
snow/ice/slush covered runway. The quantified results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Landing overrun related risk factors [Van Es, (2005)] 
Landing overrun related risk factor Risk Ratio 
Non-precision approach* 25 
Long landing 55 
Excess approach speed 38 
Visual approach* 27 
Significant tailwind present 5 
High on threshold 26 
Wet/flooded runway 10 
Snow/ice/slush covered runway 14 
*Compared to a precision approach. 
 
The risk ratios are derived assuming that they are independent of each other. In 
reality this is not necessarily the case for all risk factors.  For instance the 
landing overrun risk is much higher when a non-precision or visual approach is 
flown. These approach types are more likely to become unstabilised (e.g. flying 
too fast and too high) than precision approaches. Indeed the vast majority of 
overruns in which there was an excess approach speed occurred during a non-
precision or visual approach (81%). Furthermore in 80% of all landing overrun 
accidents that were high over the threshold the approach type was non-precision 
or visual. Similar in 82% of all overruns in which a long landing was reported the 
approach type was a non-precision or visual approach. From these data it 
becomes clear that there is a correlation between the risk factors “Excess 
approach speed”, “Long landing” and “High on approach” with non-precision or 
visual approaches. To use the quantified factors related to non-precision or 
visual approaches for any kind of risk index, a correction should be made to 
account for this correlation and to avoid double counting of the risk factors. The 
risk ratios for non-precision approaches and visual approaches are reduced by 
81% (average of the three percentages indentified), resulting in the following new 
risk ratio of 5 for both non-precision approaches and visual approaches (both 
rounded to 5). The table with the corrected risk ratios as required for the risk 
index are shown in table 2. 
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Table 2 Corrected landing overrun related risk factors 
Landing overrun related risk factor Risk Ratio 
Non-precision approach* 5 
Long landing 55 
Excess approach speed 38 
Visual approach* 5 
Significant tailwind present 5 
High on threshold 26 
Wet/flooded runway 10 
Snow/ice/slush covered runway 14 
 
Table 2 does not list the influence of the remaining runway length on the landing 
overrun risk. When the available runway length is much higher than the required 
stopping distance it seems logical that the overrun risk would become less even 
with the presence of many risk factors. For instance a long landing should not be 
a problem for an aircraft that lands on 4,000 m long runway when the aircraft 
needs (according to the operating manual) 800 m for a full stop. In this case the 
remaining runway distance to stop the aircraft is 3,200 m. Detailed analysis of 
some 182 landing overruns showed that as the remaining distance to stop the 
aircraft becomes more than approximately 1,600 m the risk of a landing overrun 
decreases1). This 1,600 m seems rather high at first. However, this is the 
difference between the available runway length and certified landing distance 
required to stop the aircraft. In the previous example the 800 m landing distance 
is what the aircraft in theory and according to its flight certification should be 
able to achieve. However, in reality airline pilots do not land their aircraft as test 
pilots do and need more distance to stop the aircraft. The empirical relation 
between the remaining distance to stop the aircraft and the risk ratio is shown in 
Figure 1. This relation is based on the correlation of the identified 182 landing 
overrun occurrences with the number of landings by runway length. Note that the 
landing distance required is defined here without any dispatch safety factors 
(e.g. without the 1.67 factor on the landing distance as required by dispatch). 
                                               
1)
 Data source: NLR-ATSI Air Safety Database. 
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Figure 1: Influence of remaining runway on landing overrun risk 
 
2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD 
The methodology is based on the exposure that an operator has to certain 
landing overrun risk factors which are combined and weighted into an index. 
These factors are presented and quantified in section 2.2. The index represents 
the relative risk an operator has compared to a reference condition (e.g. risk 
index of one). It should be realised that a risk index of one means that the 
landing overrun risk is equal to the reference condition in which all risk factors 
are absent and that the available runway length does not affect the overrun risk 
in that case. In a simple mathematical form the landing overrun risk index for an 
individual landing is given as follows: 
( ) runwayremainingi RRRRRRkLORI ×+++= ...1  
In which RR
i
 is the risk ratio associated with a certain risk factor that is present 
during the landing. When the risk factor is absent, RR
i 
= 0. In the case that all risk 
factors from table 2 are absent from the landing, k=1, and k=0 if at least one 
factor is present. This is to avoid that the risk index become zero in the case that 
all risk factors from table 2 are absent. The parameter k has no real physical 
meaning.  
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For example an aircraft makes a localiser-only landing on a wet runway, with a 
significant tailwind. The required landing distance is 950 m, and the LDA is 
3,200 m. The risk index is then equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 4.6)2250002.0(291055 =×−××++= EXPLORI rwywettailwindNPA  
From a safety performance measurement point of view it is more meaningful to 
look at a larger set of landings and to average the risk index over these landings. 
The landing overrun risk index is then given by: 
( )
∑
∑ ×+++=
landingsall
RRRRRRk
LORI runwayremainingi
...1  
The index can be analysed for the complete fleet, for a particular aircraft type, 
for a particular airport, or even a single runway. In all cases care should be taken 
to use the index only when a sufficient number of landings are available in order 
to obtain statistical meaningful results.  
The methodology requires a number of input variables which can be obtained 
from standard flight data monitoring programs and other sources. In table 3 an 
overview of the input needed for the risk index model is listed including some 
background information of each of the variables. 
 
Table 3; Overview of the input variables of the risk index model 
 
Input for risk index 
model 
 
Remarks/background information 
Non-precision 
approach/ Visual 
approach 
It is not easy to see if a landing was conducted as a non-precision approach or visual 
approach.  However based on the used runway or on the fact that invalid glideslope 
data is recorded on the quick access recorder it can be accessed whether a landing 
was conducted as Non-precision approach/ Visual approach. 
Long landing Typically a landing is considered to be long when the distance from the threshold to 
the touchdown point is more than 2,300 ft. However this is not a generally accepted 
definition for a long landing. Some operators use different thresholds. Furthermore the 
algorithms used by available flight data monitoring software are often not very accurate 
in calculating the airborne distance leading to an overestimation of the airborne 
distance.  See for an accurate estimate of the airborne distance using quick access 
recorder data the study into landing distance performance by Van Es and Van der 
Geest [Van Es et. al., (2006)].  
Excess approach 
speed 
An excess approach speed condition exists when the CAS at or near the threshold 
exceeds Vref + 20 kts. 
Significant tailwind 
present 
A significant tailwind conditions exits whenever the tailwind at or near the threshold 
crossing is higher than 10 kts. This value of 10 kts. is not be related to the fact that 
some aircraft are certificated to land with a 15 kts. tailwind. The value of 10 kts was 
derived from the analysis of historical landing overruns for aircraft with both 10 and 15 
kts tailwind limits. The tailwind can be calculated from the quick access recorder by 
subtracting the recorded ground speed and true air speed from each other. 
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High on threshold An aircraft is considered to be high above the threshold when the (radio) altitude at the 
threshold crossing is 15 ft. above the prescribed threshold crossing height (normally 
the threshold crossing height is 50 ft.). The GPS recorded position could be used to 
the determine the threshold crossing time however it should be realised that often the 
sampling frequency and the number digits of the quick access recorded GSP position 
is insufficient to do so. Being high on the threshold does not necessarily result in a 
long landing. Unpublished flight data show that approximately 20% of all long landings 
are associated with being too high on the threshold.  
Wet/flooded runway or 
Snow/ice/slush covered 
runway 
It is difficult to access to runway condition for historical landings. An estimate of the 
runway condition can be made using the METAR data at the time of the landing. 
Remaining runway 
length 
With the quick access recorded flap setting, landing weight, approach speed, tailwind, 
the required landing distance (without dispatch correction) can be calculated and 
subtracted from the landing distance available declared for the used runway. 
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3 APPLICATION OF THE METHOD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
To illustrate how the method could work some examples are presented in this 
section using real in-flight recorded data obtained for a narrow bodied jet 
aircraft.  
 
A total of 14,000 landings for a narrow bodied jet aircraft are available. These 
landings are recorded over a 11 month period running from October 2004 until 
August 2005. The aircraft is operated at 24 different airports which have a large 
variation in runway lengths and weather conditions. The runway condition is 
estimated using METAR data valid for the time and date of the landing. For each 
recorded landing the landing overrun index is calculated.  
 
Different types of analyses can be made using the risk index such as trend 
analysis by month, by airport, or by runway. In order to obtain a statistical 
reliable average landing overrun index, a sufficient number of landings should be 
used. As a rule of thumb at least 50 landings should be considered when 
calculating the landing overrun risk index. 
 
3.2 RESULTS 
In figure 2 an example is given of the monthly trend in the average landing 
overrun risk index for the narrow bodied jet aircraft for the period October 2004 
until August 2005. The risk index appears to be higher than the average of 11 
during the months April, May, and June of 2005. In this example case detailed 
analysis of the individual landings during these months showed that this is 
mainly caused by increase in the number of landings with significant tailwind and 
landings which are high on the threshold. Such findings could trigger an operator 
to formulate measure to minimise these conditions. 
Normally a safety manager would like to compare a monthly trend to a target 
level index. Ideally one would take a value of 1 as target level for the landing 
overrun risk index. However, this is not always a feasible target. In the example 
case studied in this paper the narrow body jet aircraft is operated at airports with 
relatively short runways compared to the landing performance of this aircraft. 
This does not mean that the landings with this aircraft are unsafe, however, it 
means that the average risk levels are higher (although still acceptable when 
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considering the certification of the aircraft). Any kind of target risk level used 
should be based on the operational characteristics of the specific operator.  
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Figure 2: Example monthly trend of landing overrun index 
 
Another example of how the landing overrun risk index can be used is shown in 
Figure 3 which gives the relation between the runway length and the overrun risk 
index. It is clearly shown that the shorter runways have a higher average landing 
overrun risk index. This comes as no surprise and partly follows the relation 
given in figure 1.  
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Figure 3: Relation between runway length and the overrun index 
 
Finally another example is given in figure 4 which presents the average landing 
overrun index for all the individual airports in the dataset. The value of the index 
per airport shows a broad variation between 0.6 and 36.6. For most of the 
airports the risk index is higher than one. This is partly caused by the fact that 
the narrow body jet aircraft in the example case is mainly operated at airports 
with relatively short runways compared to the landing performance of this 
aircraft. It should be realised that a risk index of one means that the landing 
overrun risk is equal to the reference condition in which all risk factors are 
absent and the available runway length does not affect the overrun risk. Often 
this situation does not exist and the risk will be higher than the reference 
condition of one.  
The high risk index value for airport A, is caused by several factors. First this 
airport has only one runway and a relatively high number of landings are 
conducted under tailwind conditions (26% of the landings versus a 12% overall 
average). Furthermore the average landing weight at airport A is about 10% 
higher than the overall average. The large number of tailwind landings combined 
with a higher average weight results in longer landings than the fleet average. As 
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the runway is not very long (2,200 m) the landing overrun risk at airport A is 
relatively high compared to the others. Furthermore there also appears to be a 
large number of long landings at this airport (6% of the landings versus a 2% 
overall average) which also contributes to the higher risk value for airport A. 
The airport with the lowest overrun index (airport X) is the airport with the 
longest runway (4,000 m) in the dataset. The average required landing distance 
for the narrow body jet aircraft at this airport is 1,400 m. This very long runway 
more or less neutralises the landing overrun risk despite several cases of long 
landings at this airport. 
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Figure 4: Average landing overrun index per airport 
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4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 CONCLUSIONS 
A simple method to asses the risk of an operator of having a landing overrun in 
their operation is presented and discussed in this paper. Application of the 
method using real operational data shows that it can be used to analyse the 
landing overrun risk in the day-to-day operations in a meaningful way. The 
method could be a helpful tool to airlines that want to monitor and mitigate their 
landing overrun risk. 
 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended to apply the method to other landing datasets to gain more 
experience.  
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